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Introduction 
Any consensus on what is 
required by way of place-
based policies is fragile and 
time limited. In broad 
historical perspective, what 
we have is a continuing 
debate about what we see in 
the economy, and positions 
taken in that debate connect 
with how we see the political 
and institutional challenges 
and possibilities. In every 
period there will be radicals 
pressing new problem 
definitions and conservatives 
defending existing concepts 
and measures.   
The current generation of 
mainstream academic 
economists and technocrats 
are mainly in defensive 
mode. They are intellectually 
invested in generic regional 
recipes like better transport 
and training, and industrial 
strategies for building 
competitive industries of the 
future, with growth (of 
national gross domestic 
product (GDP) or regional 
gross value added (GVA)) 
and job creation as success 
indicators.  Amongst the 
radical critics is a collective of 
European academics whose 
new book, Foundational 
Economy (Foundational 
Economy  Collective, 2018) 
argues for recognising the 
heterogeneity of economic 
activity and the importance of 
basic services for citizens in 
a new civic politics of place. 
As noted in this article, the 
position is partly about 
recovery and restatement of 
what was taken for granted 
by an earlier generation of 
English economists and 
social theorists like Keynes 
and Beveridge. 
This paper which makes 
these points is organised into 
three sections.  The first 
section explains what the 
foundational economy is and 
why it matters; the second 
section considers the 
problems of implementing 
foundational politics. The first 
two sections contain some 
illustrative Welsh material, 
while the third and final 
section considers how Welsh 
Government has begun to 
use foundational economy 
language in policy 
documents such as the 2017 
Economic Action Plan, and 
whether this has the potential 
to bring real change in policy 
directions.  
What is the foundational 
economy and why does it 
matter?   
For the past thirty years or 
more, economic policy has 
privileged individual 
consumption, partly through 
the preoccupation with 
(growth of) GDP which is of 
course more than 60% 
consumption in the UK case; 
the bias is reinforced by the 
focus on jobs and job 
creation as a way of 
distributing market income. 
The inherent limits of GDP as 
a measure of economic 
welfare are rehearsed in all 
the standard histories of the 
concept (Coyle, 2014; 
Fioramonti, 2013).  These 
difficulties are compounded 
when increases in national 
GDP (or regional GVA) per 
capita are socially divisive, 
because they are unequally 
distributed between working 
households, As Figure 1 
shows, over the past 50 
years the top 20% of working 
households claim nearly half 
the nominal income growth, 
while the bottom 20% claim a 
negligible share.  
This paper suggests a 
change of lens, and argues 




for a new focus on the social 
wellbeing of citizens, which in 
the developmental frame of 
Sen (1999), is a matter of 
capabilities which maintain or 
expand opportunity and 
freedom for individuals to 
make meaningful life 
choices. In our view well-
being depends on collective 
consumption of essential 
goods and services. These 
are distributed to all 
households via networks and 
branches which are the 
infrastructure of everyday 
life. Providential services 
include health services and 
care, universal primary and 
secondary schooling; while a 
material infrastructure of 
pipes and cables connect 
every house. Altogether, 
these systems make 
everyday life possible, safe 
and civilised. 
In the late 19th century, clean 
water and sewerage had 
added 25 years to life 
expectancy in large cities; 
and social insurance was the 
major socio-technic 
innovation of the first half of 
the twentieth century. In the 
period 1920-1950, the 
importance of foundational 
infrastructure was self- 
evident for economists, 
social theorists and social 
democratic politicians.  
Tawney (1931, pp. 134-5) 
praised piped water and 
sanitation as ‘collective 
provision for needs which no 
ordinary individual, even if he 
works overtime all his life, 
can provide himself’.  
Aneurin Bevan (1952, p.73) 
valued ‘social codes that 
have the collective well- 
being for their aim’ and 
contrasted a civic health 
service for all citizens with 
systems under which the 
‘small well to do classes’ 
looked after their own needs’. 
By the late 1950s, Galbraith 
(1958, p. 187) warned about 
a problem of ‘social balance’. 
In the United States, 
individual incomes were 
rising while public transport 
decayed and air pollution 
increased so that ‘the 
discussion of this public 
poverty was matched by the 
stories of ever increasing 
private opulence’.  However, 
for the past fifty years the UK 
and other high income 
countries, have been feeding 
this imbalance. Foundational 
networks and branches 
require maintenance and 
new investment which is not 
provided automatically out of 
rising individual incomes. 
Problems about access to 
basic services can recur at 
Figure 1: UK non-retired household share of (nominal) income growth 
Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS), London. Based on original income. 




higher income levels; as in 
present day London where 
housing is unaffordable even 
for middle income groups.  
If unmet needs remain, the 
scale of existing foundational 
provision generates a large 
volume of employment.  This 
is distributed between and 
within regions according to 
population because the long 
term unemployed in the 
south Wales valleys and 
investment bankers in 
London all shower in the 
morning, shop at the 
supermarket and use public 
transport. Providential and 
material services are 
everywhere large-scale 
employers, especially in 
Wales where the tradeable 
goods sectors of coal, steel 
and assembly have 
collapsed. As Figure 2 
shows, in Wales providential 
services account for 33% of 
employment and material 
infrastructure for another 
15%, and these shares will 
vary across Wales. Most of 
this employment is sheltered 
with wages and conditions 
not determined by 
international competition; 
although supply chains, as 
with food and energy, often 
extend nationally and 
internationally. 
The foundational provision of 
essentials is crucial to well-
being on the demand side; 
and, large enough by any 
metric on the supply side. 
However, it is only part of a 
larger whole and one of the 
crucial intellectual questions 
is how we think of that larger 
economy. In mainstream 
economics, the larger whole 
is a singular ‘economy’ 
whose elements can be 
added together as in 
calculations of GDP and are 
classically underpinned by 
one supposed law of value.  
In foundational thinking, the 
larger whole is re-
conceptualised as a complex 
totality which, in Figure 3, is 
represented as a layering of 
strata where heterogeneous 
activities have 
characteristically different 
business models, sources of 
revenue and organisational 
forms. The different strata 
exist in relations of 
necessary interdependence 
and occasional interference. 
Beneath, the foundational is 
the affective, non-
transactional, informal 
sphere which the New 
Economics Foundation 
Figure 2: Foundational Economy employment, Wales and Swansea Bay City Region. 
Source: UK Business Register and Employment Survey, ONS. 




(2015, pp.19-20) calls the 
‘core economy’ of child 
rearing, informal care and 
house work whereby 
‘uncommodified human and 
social resources (are) 
embedded in the everyday 
life’.  Above the foundational 
economy of daily necessities 
is an outer sphere of the 
overlooked economy which 
includes commodified, 
cultural necessities like 
sofas, haircuts and holidays 
where purchase is 
occasional and can be 
postponed. The competitive, 
tradeable part of the 
economy in Wales is then a 
residual which accounts for 
less than one third of 
employment and a much 
smaller proportion of useful 
effort if the many hours of 
unpaid domestic labour are 
included.    
This conceptualisation has 
two implications:  
 When policy makers talk 
about the economy, they 
almost always talk about 
just part of the economy 
because they are 
concerned with the part 
that is competitive and 
tradeable. Consequently, 
their industrial or regional 
policy will be narrowly 
focused on building high 
tech industries of the 
future and attracting 
inward investment.  We 
are practically concerned 
with what is in the rest of 
the economy, which, as 
Figure 2 shows, accounts 
for at least two thirds of 
employment in Wales; 
and should be 
intellectually concerned 
not to repeat the old policy 
mistake of confusing the 
part for the whole.  
• What gets into the 
foundational economy, 
and how, is always a 
matter of political contest 
and changes over time. 
The 1951 Conservative 
party Manifesto 
announced “housing is the 
first of the social services”; 
while prime ministers 
Thatcher and Blair 
redefined housing as a 
private asset through 
council house sales. 
Foundational provision is 
inevitably mixed up with 
citizen duties like sending 
children to school and 
citizen rights such as free 
medical care. Citizen 
rights can expand or 
contract; as they have 
done recently in the UK 
when austerity cuts have 
effectively removed the 
citizen’s right to legal aid. 
So the policy question is 
not about the technically 
correct economic policy 
but about how to do 
foundational politics so 
citizens can access 
quality foundational 
Figure 3: Interdependent economic activities as characterised by foundational economy principles. 




services provided by 
decently paid workers. 
Foundational politics and 
how to do it  
The established paradigm of 
economic policy for national 
and regional policy starts 
from a narrow concept of 
how to make the economy 
work (so as to generate 
growth and jobs) through a 
generic recipe: any/every 
region can boost growth by 
adding ‘economic 
infrastructure’ (narrowly 
defined as transport 
improvements) plus training 
and skills which will together 
make the labour market work 
better. This can be backed 
nationally by industrial policy 
which, in the Department of 
Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (2017) 
white paper, ‘industrial 
strategy’ is about supporting 
early stage innovation in 
industries of the future. For a 
laggard region like Wales, 
regional policy is all of the 
above plus an attempt to 
attract mobile investment to 
large projects.  
In this frame, economic 
policy is top-down because 
economic policy is something 
done by political and 
technical elites to, and for, 
ordinary citizens. The model 
is that political elites should 
choose from a menu of policy 
options which is decided and 
costed by experts who know 
what to do. Thus, transport 
improvement and training 
usually involve negotiation 
with business interests and 
competition for limited 
funding but little engagement 
with citizens, except where 
there are objectors who need 
to be conciliated or more 
usually talked out. Economic 
and social policy operate in 
different silos. The social 
problem of poverty and 
deprivation is to be tackled 
using different policies, as 
with the Welsh Government’s 
Communities First 
programme, sponsored by a 
separate group of ministers 
and experts.   
On this basis, the standard 
political offer is ‘vote for us 
and we will make the 
economy work for you’. And 
the immediate problem is 
that national economic policy 
rests on a misunderstanding 
about growth drivers; and 
regional economic policy 
does not by its own criteria 
deliver relative improvement. 
Since the 1980s, the UK 
economy is not productively 
driven but consumption and 
debt led by a system of 
‘privatized Keynesianism’ 
(Crouch, 2009); 
unsustainable growth of GDP 
is bought through housing 
equity withdrawal which 
allows rising house prices to 
leak into consumption.   
As for regional policies in 
laggard regions like Wales, 
they cannot redress 
economic disadvantage as 
officially defined and the 
electorate shows no political 
gratitude. The Welsh 
Government used to have a 
target of closing the GVA gap 
with London and the South 
East but that has been 
dropped because Welsh 
GVA has been stuck at 
around 75% of the 
successful regions for the 
past twenty years. Worse 
still, the electorate is 
politically indifferent or 
ungrateful. Ebbw Vale has 
been gifted an Enterprise 
Zone, a dual carriageway 
A465, a new Coleg Gwent 
and a refurbished town 
centre; yet in the 2016 Welsh 
Assembly election the 
turnout in Blaenau Gwent 
was 42% and in the EU 
referendum 62% voted 
leave.  
The fundamental imperative 
then is that policy has to 
change because economic 
underperformance leaks into 
political disaffection with 
centrist offerings and 
threatens parties with 
established electoral 
franchises.  The question of 
what to do next is then a 
huge and overwhelming 
question. In our view, the first 
sensible step would be to 
recognise the limits of the 
mainstream agenda of 
growth and jobs through 
competitivity; and the second 
step would be to drop the 
pretence that  policy can buy 
growth and relegate 
economic management to its 
original Keynesian task of the 
task of stabilising output and 
avoiding recessions. The 
third constructive step would 
be to accept that the 
distinctive, primary role of 
public policy going forward 
should be to secure the 
supply of basic services for 
all citizens.  
This renewed commitment to 
services is all the more 
necessary because the post 
1979 state policies of 




privatisation and outsourcing 
plus private sector 
financialization have licensed 
predation on, and 
degradation of, many 
foundational sectors. In 
historical perspective, the 
foundational economy 
(public or privately owned) 
had historically been low risk, 
steady return with long time 
horizons and expectations of 
a 5% return on capital. 
Privatization in the 1980s, 
and outsourcing in the 1990s 
then brought in stock market 
quoted corporates, private 
equity houses and fund 
investors with market-driven 
requirements for a return of 
more than 10%, and 
financialised business 
models developed in high 
risk, high return, short time 
horizon activities. 
As we have explained 
elsewhere (Bowman et al., 
2015), returns in foundational 
sectors can be levered up in 
the short term by financial 
devices like investment 
rationing, tax avoidance, 
asset stripping and loading 
enterprises with debt.  While 
Dwr Cymru did not (like 
English water companies) 
distribute profits while 
borrowing to invest, Wales 
could not avoid the 
privatisation of British 
Telecom or rail  franchising. 
Meanwhile, under pressure 
from financial markets, 
corporate power is routinely 
used by private operators to 
boost revenue by confusion 
pricing like the special offers 
in supermarkets or ‘free’ 
retail banking or multiple 
utility tariffs. While costs can 
be reduced by hitting on 
stakeholders who account for 
a major part of costs (like 
labour in adult care or 
suppliers in supermarkets) 
so that costs and 
consequences are passed 
down the line. 
If these problems are the 
result of the intrusion of 
financialised business 
models and forms of 
calculation into foundational 
activities, it is less easy to 
see what is to be done. Re-
nationalisation is expensive 
and economics- based 
regulators have failed to 
restrain predatory 
behaviours and require basic 
service. So, we have 
elsewhere argued (Bowman 
et al., 2014, pp.134-9) the 
case for a political system of 
social licensing and explicit 
social obligations for 
corporate providers of 
foundational services. 
Beyond this, matters are 
complicated because we do 
not start by knowing what to 
do, though we can 
recommend four general 
principles: 
1. Break down the line 
between economic and 
social policy which will 
require rethinking the 
objectives of policy. For 
example, while higher 
productivity is relevant to 
adult care, it cannot be 
the main objective of 
policy if care is about 
maintaining the social 
relations of older people 
as much as about 
meeting their medical 
needs.  
 
2. Accept that policy means 
learning from 
experiments and social 
innovation which in the 
first instance will be local. 
For example, there is a 
need to experiment with 
policies to secure the 
future of grounded, family 
owned SME firms; and 
adapt training and 
business assistance 
models for micro firms 
which need something 
more like the ‘pop up 
business school’. 
 
3. Accept innovation will not 
abolish hard policy 
choices. Many sectors of 
the foundational 
economy are built on the 
exploitation of cheap 
labour; new policy 
objectives and 
instruments in sectors 
like tourism and care will 
not increase the funds 
available to pay wages 
unless consumers or 
taxpayers give more.  
 
4. Recognise the need to 
break with the political 
model of top down policy 
with government as the 
leading actor. Adding 
participative and 
deliberative democracy is 
difficult but has to be 
done because we fear 
what will happen without 
engagement. Experiment 
will require coalitions of 
regional and local actors; 
with intermediary 
institutions often in the 
lead and government in 
an enabling role. 




Again these proposals are 
partly rediscovery.  From the 
1920s to the 1950s, 
intermediary institutions 
(neither state nor market) 
played a major role in the 
blueprint plans for a better 
capitalism by liberals like 
Keynes and Beveridge. 
Keynes (1926) envisaged 
that expert quangos would 
allocate government funds 
on the post war model of the 
University Grants 
Committee; Beveridge 
(1948) expected friendly 
societies to provide income 
related benefits above the 
flat rate state minimum. None 
of this worked out in the 
1950s as firm based 
occupational pensions 
replaced friendly societies 
and only the Arts Council 
escaped the demise of the 
quangos. One of the big 
questions arising is: can we 
make intermediary 
institutions work second time 
around?    
For Wales these proposals 
would also represent a 
reinvention of the civic. The 
process of deindustrialisation 
worked along with 
secularization and the 
decline of mass parties to 
weaken the civic institutions 
and networks which made 
things work and provided 
ordinary people with 
opportunities for social 
connection and leadership.  
In South Wales, after the 
collapse of the large 
unionised work place around 
one quarter of the private 
sector work force is 
unionised; and regular 
attenders of church and 
chapel account for no more 
than 10% of the population. 
Here is a huge opportunity 
for new institutions and 
engagement which would 
generate political energy.  
The Welsh Government 
and the Foundational 
Economy  
The Welsh Government’s 
economic policies have until 
very recently been 
completely mainstream and 
orthodox. And continue to be 
so. New initiatives like the 
Swansea City Deal are of 
course framed by Treasury 
orthodoxy.  However Welsh 
ministers are more than 
capable of unforced errors 
when, for example, they have 
not brought a proper 
scepticism to the claimed 
benefits from the South East 
Wales metro. While broadly 
based, Welsh support for 
expensive electricity from the 
Swansea Bay Barrage is a 
troubling indicator of the 
continuing attraction of grand 
projects as the supposed 
basis for world leading new 
industries. 
At the same time, there is in 
recent Welsh Government 
economic policy documents 
a new realism about the 
Welsh economy as it is. The 
Welsh Government’s (2017) 
Economic Action Plan 
recognises four ‘foundation 
sectors’ (care, tourism, food 
and retail) are the 
‘backbones of many local 
economies’. But there is 
confusion about policy 
objectives and levers as new 
sectors easily become the 
means to old objectives. 
Thus, the Valleys Task Force 
(2017) Delivery Plan 
promises ‘the number of jobs 
in the foundational economy 
will be increased’ without 
justifying the objective or 
explaining how this is to be 
achieved. 
The Welsh Government has 
borrowed the new 
foundational language but it 
is not clear whether it can 
move from talking 
foundational economy in an 
often confused way to doing 
foundational economy in a 
new and radical way. And the 
fundamental issues at stake 
here are not about economic 
policy objectives and policy 
levers. The question is 
whether Welsh Government 
can take an active role in 
sponsoring a new municipal 
politics which is prerequisite 
if the foundational project is 
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